Labor Law - Right to Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Union-Management Retirement Agreement by Ravick, Lawrence N., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 6 
1955 
Labor Law - Right to Unemployment Compensation as Affected by 
Union-Management Retirement Agreement 
Lawrence N. Ravick S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence N. Ravick S.Ed., Labor Law - Right to Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Union-
Management Retirement Agreement, 53 MICH. L. REV. 849 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss6/4 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COMMENTS 
LABOR LAW - RIGHT TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AS 
AFFECTED BY UNION-MANAGEMENT RETIREMENT AGREEMENTS-
Under what circumstances has an employee "voluntarily" left work so 
as to disqualify him from receiving benefits under an unemployment 
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compensation act?1 This general question has troubled the courts 
for a considerable time and has presented itself in a variety of fact 
situations, e.g., leaving work because of labor disputes2 and for per-
sonal reasons.3 The courts' interpretation of the meaning of "volun-
tarily" has generally been influenced by numerous considerations such 
as the policy behind unemployment compensation, the specific termi-
nology of the statute involved, and the procedure for financing the plans. 
The specific problem with which this comment deals is summarized in 
the following question: when an employee leaves his employment by 
reason of a union contract calling for his retirement by the employer 
at a given age plus receipt of a pension, is such employee barred from 
benefits under an unemployment compensation act because his leaving 
is "voluntary"? The decisions of the administrative and judicial bodies 
that have dealt with this issue4 have been far from unanimous. Since 
a basic knowledge of the typical unemployment compensation act is 
necessary for an understanding of the problem, an attempt will be made 
to summarize those statutory provisions which are pertinent. An 
examination will then be made of the reasoning by which the courts, 
tribunals and writers reach one or the other result. Finally, there will 
be singled out for particular attention some of the analytical fallacies 
and pitfalls which tend to obscure the real issues and complicate the 
process by which decisions in this area are reached. 
I. Statutory Background 
Pertinent Provisions of Unemployment Insurance Acts. Unem-
ployment compensation acts exist in all 48 states, Alaska, Hawaii, and 
the District of Columbia.5 The typical act contains, among other mat-
ters, a declaration of policy, an eligibility provision and a disqualifica-
tion clause. One of the disqualification sections relates to the nature 
1 An example of the typical wording of such acts is found in the New Jersey statute: 
" ... an individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (a) For the week in which he has left 
work voluntarily without good cause .•.. " N.J. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 43, §21-5(a). 
2 See 25 WASH. L. REv. 50, 99 (1950); 36 h.L. B.J. 364 (1948). 
3 See Peterson, "Unemployment Insurance in Colorado-Eligibility and Disqualifica-
tion," 25 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 180 at 191 (1953). 
4 Under the unemployment compensation statutes of the states, the great majority of 
appeals from unemployment benefit determinations are settled by administrative tribunals. 
5 For a list of the citations of the unemployment compensation acts of all tlie states 
as of 1948, see 10 Omo ST. L.J. 238, n. 2 (1949). In some quarters it is believed that 
unemployment compensation should be placed on a federal level. Haber and Joseph, "Ap-
praising the Social Security Program-Unemployment Compensation," 202 ANNALS 22 at 31 
(1939); FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORTS 43 (1949). Cf. 30 AM. LAB. 
LEc. REv. 151 (1940). 
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of the employee's termination of his employment. During the early 
development of these statutes many of them did not disqualify a claim-
ant who voluntarily left his job, but since the early 1940's, such pro-
visions have become increasingly prevalent. Today they exist in every 
state. 6 According to one writer,7 this helps carry out the policy behind 
unemployment compensation by aiding those workers whose unemploy-
ment is caused by lack of work but not those who are unemployed 
through their own fault. However, in only one state does a voluntary 
discontinuance of work cause automatic disqualification.8 In all other 
states, a claimant is not disqualified unless he voluntarily quit work 
"without good cause" or "without good cause attributable to the em-
ployer."9 
Policy Behind Unemployment Compensation Acts. The basic 
purpose of these acts is to provide the diligent worker with partial in-
surance against the hazards of economic insecurity by providing him 
with benefit payments on the occasion of involuntary unemployment.10 
Today, almost every unemployment compensation act declares this to 
be the public policy.11 A secondary aim of these acts is to serve the 
general public interest by stabilizing employment, maintaining con-
sumer purchasing power, preserving labor standards and increasing 
labor mobility.12 The system of unemployment compensation is de-
signed to insure the risk of short-term unemployment. 
Experience Rating. The funds from which benefits are paid are 
generally obtained from payroll taxes levied on employers. In the over-
whelming majority of the states the rates are varied in some degree with 
6 For the early development of disqualification provisions, see generally Malisoff, "The 
Emergence of Unemployment Compensation," 54 PoL. Ser. Q. 237 (1939); Witte, "De-
velopment of Unemployment Compensation," 55 YALE L.J. 21 at 41 (1945). For the 
British construction of the phrase "voluntarily leaves his employment" see BRlTISH UMPIRE 
DECISIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION lNTBRPRBTATION SERVICE, p. 101 (1938). 
7 Kempfer, "Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct," 55 YALE L.J. 
147 at 149 (1945). 
8 Jn Montana a claimant is disqualified by any voluntary quitting whether there be 
just cause or not. 
9 Ohio limits disqualification to "just cause." In nine states and Hawaii, good cause 
is restricted to good cause connected with the work, attributable to the employment or the 
employer. In the other 29 states, Alaska and the District of Columbia, the general good 
cause provision includes good personal cause. U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INsuRANCB LAws (as of Aug. 1954) p. 82. 
10 The original reason for using the phrase "involuntary unemployment" was to pro-
vide support against constitutional attacks. Harrison, "Statutory Purpose and 'Involuntary 
Unemployment,'" 55 YALE L.J. 117"at 118 (1945). 
11 For example, N.J. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 43, §21-2; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1952) 
tit. 43, §752; 30 N.Y. Consol. Laws (Mcl&mey, 1950) Labor Law, §501. 
12See ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WoRK 17 (1950). 
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the past employment experience of each employer. This variation in 
the employer's tax rate is known as experience rating. Almost all states 
provide for such a plan, the purpose of which is to serve as an induce-
ment for employers to stabilize employment in their businesses, i.e., 
the smaller the depletion in the employer's fund, the lower will be his 
future compensation tax.13 In analyzing the voluntary character of a 
claimant's departure from work, the procedure for financing the plans 
must be considered since the courts generally refer to the adverse effect 
on the employer's tax rates if benefits were allowed to those who are 
not strictly "involuntarily unemployed." Where an employer has pro-
vided for pension benefits he may be required to bear the double 
burden of contributing to both pension plans and the unemployment 
compensation fund. However, he could probably shed a part of this 
double burden by providing that pension payments are to be reduced 
by the amount of any unemployment compensation recovered by the 
employee.14 
II. Retirement Is 'Voluntary" 
If an employee is retired by his employer at a given age (there 
being no provision to that effect in his individual employment contract), 
it seems clear that he would be considered "involuntarily unem-
ployed."15 Should the result be different when a labor union's repre-
sentation is added? Does the collective bargaining agreement render 
the termination "voluntary?"16 It has been argued that the answer 
should be in the affirmative since the collective bargaining agreement 
becomes, in effect, part of the employee's contract of employment.17 
18 For the theories and methods of experience rating systems, see Arnold, "Experience 
Rating," 55 YALE L.J. 218 (1945). Cf. Rainwater, "The Fallacy of Experience Rating," 
2 LAB. L.J. 95 (1951). 
14BoYcE, How TO PLAN PENSIONS 31 (1950). 
15 On the other hand, when an employee subscribes to a pension plan under which 
he voluntarily agrees to retire at a given age, he cannot claim unemployment benefits upon 
a theory that he has been discharged. Madison Gas and Elec. Co. v. Gardner and Indus-
trial Commission of Wisconsin, (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1951) CCH, EMPL. lNs. REP., p. 52535, 
,i8602 Gust prior to retirement, claimant signed a statement, "I accept retirement"). Hall 
v. Board of Review, 160 Pa. Super. 65, 49 A. (2d) 872 (1946). 
16 A related problem is found where there is a general shutdown so that all eligible 
employees may take their vacations simultaneously in accordance with a collective bargain-
ing agreement between union and employer. Under these circumstances, are employees 
who are not eligible for vacation pay, entitled to unemployment compensation for the period 
covered by the shutdown? This problem is treated in detail in 30 A.L.R. (2d) 366 (1953). 
Some courts have held that such unpaid employees are voluntarily unemployed on a theory 
that the union is the employee's agent and that its action constituted an agreement on the 
part of the employees to take an unpaid vacation. Most courts take the view that such 
employees are out of work through no fault of their own and therefore are entitled to 
benefits. 
17 Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W. (2d) 
449 (1951); Barclay White Co. v. Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. (2d) 336, cert. 
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The theories on which the courts enforce such agreements are diverse,18 
but regardless of the theory used and the difficulty in fitting this situa-
tion into conventional contract concepts, such collective agreements are 
valid and enforceable.19 Since the contract made by the union becomes 
the contract of the employees and calls for their retirement by the com-
pany at a given age, the employees have made the matter compulsory 
to the employer and have fixed the status of their retirement as volun-
tary. The claimant may not take a position calling for compulsory 
retirement in his employment contract and then repudiate it in order 
to claim involuntary unemployment for the purpose of unemployment 
compensation benefits.20 By the collective agreement the union spoke 
for the employees to the same extent as they could as individuals. Fur-
thermore, it seems inconsistent with the purpose of the unemployment 
compensation acts to permit employees to dictate through a strong union 
the circumstances under which they will be eligible for unemployment 
compensation. 21 
III. Retirement Is "Involuntary" 
Equally persuasive arguments are presented to uphold the proposi-
tion that worker does not voluntarily leave work when he is "retired" 
under a collective bargaining contract made for him by the union. 
Since an individual employee might be in the minority as to specific 
terms of a collective contract and yet be bound by its requirements,22 
the conclusion that he individually consented to the terms of the agree-
ment is pure fiction. Even though an employee is legally bound by the 
den. 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63 (1947); In re Emp. Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 32 
Wash. (2d) 205, 201 P. (2d) 194 (1948). 
18 The three main theories used by the courts are (1) usage and custom theory (col-
lective bargaining agreements establish usages which, unless expressly rejected by the 
employee, are binding terms of the individual's employment); (2) third party beneficiary 
theory (such agreements are :in the nature of a third party beneficiary contract); (3) agency 
theory (the union is an agent for the employee). The first of these theories has definitely 
lost favor with the courts :in recent years. The third theory is defective in that it would 
be of no help to a non-union member, nor to one who joins a union subsequent to the 
making of a contract, unless he later ratified it. For a discussion of these various theories, 
see Rice, "Collective Labor Agreements in American Law,'' 44 HAnv. L. REv. 572 (1931); 
TELLER, Luion D1sPtJTEs AND CoLLEcnvE BARGAINING §163 (1940). 
19 TELLER, Luion DISPtJTES AND CoLLEcnvE BARGAINING §163 (1940). The union 
even has power to enter into collective agreements adversely affecting the interests of some 
of its members. O'Keefe v. Local 463, 277 N.Y. 300, 14 N.E. (2d) 77 (1938). 
20 Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A. (2d) 514 
(1953); Dept. of Industrial Relations v. Pesnell, 29 Ala. App. 528, 199 S. 720 (1940). 
21 See Barclay White Co. v. Board of. Review, 356 Pa. 43 at 52, 50 A. (2d) 336, cert. 
den. 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63 (1947). 
22 Hartley v. Brotherhood, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938). It is also possible 
that the worker was forced against his will to join the union if there was a closed or union 
shop contract. 
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union contract, this should not preclude him from unemployment 
compensation when he is retired against his will by reason of the 
agreement.23 The union-employer contract is a mutual agreement in 
which each side has a voice. Thus there is merely a concurrent deter-
mination of the terms of employment. When an employee reaches the 
specified age, the terms of employment expire; there is neither discharge 
nor withdrawal. Applicants for jobs frequently must accept work even 
though they are informed that it will last only for a stated period of 
time. When the employee accepts a job which he knows in advance to 
be temporary, his leaving at the specified time is not voluntary within 
the meaning of the unemployment compensation acts. Although the 
term of employment is longer, the retirement situation is not essentially 
different. 24 
It is argued that the legislatures intended to limit disqualification 
to those separations resulting from a decision on the part of the worker 
himself. In the "retirement" situation the employee does not exercise 
his own volition in leaving his job. He has no alternative other than 
to submit to the employer's retirement policy, no matter how that policy 
was originated. Since one purpose of unemployment compensation is 
to improve the position of the unemployed worker, the courts should 
keep in mind this broad social aspect of the acts to permit a complete 
realization of the legislatures' intent.25 Thus, many courts have said 
that the acts must be liberally construed to further their remedial pur-
pose and all doubts should be resolved in favor of those to be benefited.26 
IV. Confusion Within the Courts 
Many of the direct and collateral matters discussed by the courts 
as bearing upon the problem of "involuntarily" leaving work must be 
carefully examined before their true relevancy can be determined. 
The first of these matters relates to the receipt of "retirement" pen-
sions. Should the receipt of such pensions be determinative of an em-
ployee's statutory right to unemployment benefits? Two separate and 
23 Where an employee has the option of retiring or continuing to work beyond the 
retirement age (if the union and company agree to it), leaving work at the retirement age 
disqualifies him from benefits. Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A. 
(2d) 277 (1953). 
24 Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A. (2d) 287 (1953). 
25 Empire Star Mines Co. v. California Employment Cornn., (Cal. App. 1945) 158 
P. (2d) 606. 
26 illustrative are Henry A. Dreer, Inc. v. Board of Review, 127 N.J.L. 149 at 152, 
21 A. (2d) 690 (1941); Calif. Employment Cornn. v. Black-Foxe Military Inst., 43 Cal. 
App. (2d) 868 at 872, 110 P. (2d) 729 (1941); Bergen Point Iron Works v. Board of 
Review, 137 N.J.L. 685 at 686, 61 A. (2d) 267 (1948). 
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distinct problems are raised here. (I) Has the worker left his job 
"without good cause?" Although the answer is not clear cut, it appears 
that he would be disqualified from compensation. Absent contrary evi-
dence, the inducement for leaving work would be deemed to be the 
pension benefits, the receipt of which hardly constitutes "good cause."27 
Some courts have confused this question with the related one of 
whether the claimant's leaving was "involuntary." (2) Does the re-
ceipt of this income have any effect upon an unemployed worker's 
position by reason of express statutory limitation? In only sixteen 
states28 have the acts expressly eliminated or reduced the amount of 
benefits for any week in which the claimant receives a pension from 
his employer. In no state does receipt of income from sources not 
connected with his job disqualify a claimant, since an employee need 
not be indigent to secure the benefits provided by law. The statutory 
scheme makes no provision for inquiring into an individual's financial 
needs.29 
The second pitfall is found in the failure of some courts to limit 
their analyses to the question of whether the claimant has "left work 
voluntarily" within the meaning of the statute of the particular state. 
Since all present unemployment compensation acts disqualify only 
employees whose voluntary quitting lacks "good cause," it is possible 
for a court to find that a worker who leaves "voluntarily" (in the voli-
tional sense) with good cause is "involuntarily unemployed" and still 
eligible for compensation.30 But when an employee is automatically 
"retired" at an age specified in a collective bargaining agreement, the 
issue is solely whether the retirement is "voluntary." Only if a deter-
mination is made against the claimant (that he left of his own volition) 
does the existence or non-existence of "good cause" enter the analysis. 
21 U.S. BUREAu oF EMPLOYMENT SEc1lIIITY, UNEMPLOYMENT CoMPENSATION IN-
TERPRETATION SERVICE-BENEFIT SERIES, vol. 5, no. 9, p. 242 (a 78-year-old coal miner 
who was retired at his own request in order to be eligible to receive old-age pension held 
to have left work voluntarily without good cause); Id., vol. 8, no. 6, p. 131 (a 65-year-old 
blacksmith left his job after he became entitled to retire on a pension held to have left 
work voluntarily without good cause when the policy of the employer was to permit em-
ployees to work after reaching retirement age); Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 
N.J. 447, 100 A. (2d) 277 (1953). 
28 U.S. BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SEC1lIIITY, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOY-
MENT lNsURANCE l.Aws (as of Aug. 1954) p. 103. Cf. 35 MmN. L. REv. 610 (1950). 
29 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 711 at 712 (1951); Friel v. Board of Review, 167 Pa. Super. 
362, 75 A. (2d) 7 (1950). 
30 Compare Dept. of Labor v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 133 Pa. Super. 
518 at 520, 3 A. (2d) 211 (1938) with Teicher v. Board of Review, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 
35 A. (2d) 739 (1944), and Billey Elec. Co. v. Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 
A. (2d) 898 (1946). 
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Yet some courts discuss these issues interchangeably-as if they were 
one and the same. A reference to one instance of this muddled think-
ing is made in the above discussion of pensions. If the issue is whether 
the worker quit "involuntarily," the receipt of the pension should be 
irrelevant. Not only may "good cause" be confused with the involun-
tary nature of the termination of employment, but once it is decided 
that the leaving is voluntary the court may overlook the unlimited "good 
cause" provision of its own statute and apply the more restrictive statute 
of another jurisdiction. 31 The use of alleged "precedents" is confusing 
and dangerous when based upon a statute that is worded differently. 
Thirdly, the courts have also merged at times the similar but sep-
arate considerations governing a worker's disqualification and eligibil-
ity, and have produced a confusing definition of "involuntary unem-
ployment" by relating these problems to the availability-for-work issue·.32 
A voluntary leaving of work may be evidence of an intent not to work. 
Such an intent may, in tum, prove that the claimant is not available for 
employment and is therefore ineligible for benefits.33 The ground of 
ineligibility, however, is the intent not to work, not the voluntary 
character of the leaving. 
Finally, and of most importance, needless confusion has arisen by 
"judicial excursions into the metaphysics of freedom of the will and 
microscopic inspection of the volitional processes constituting the act 
by which the claimant has become unemployed."34 In deciding that a 
quitting was involuntary, some courts emphasize that the employee's 
claim to benefits is determined by his motives at the time of the termi-
nation. Such an analysis is not entirely realistic, however, when a 
union, as the worker's agent, has negotiated the retirement contract. 
On the other hand, a conclusion that the employee left voluntarily 
because the union acted in his stead at the bargaining table indicates 
that any termination of employment is voluntary if consensual. But 
this assumption is not always true. Such an approach would meet with 
difficult factual determinations, e.g., did the company or the union have 
the upper hand during the bargaining. The volitional test postulates 
31 See note 9 supra for the various types of statutes. Campbell Soup Co. v. Board of 
Review, 24 N.J. Super. 311, 94 A. (2d) 514 (1953), followed this tendency by stressing 
the fact that retirement was compulsory to the employer, notwithstanding the fact that 
this was of no special importance under a New Jersey type statute. For a view that an 
"employer's fault" concept has no place in the unemployment compensation program, see 
Simrell, "Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensa-
tion,'' 55 YALE L.J. 181 (1945); 17 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 447 (1949). 
32Valenti v. Board of Review, 4 N.J. 287, 72 A. (2d) 516 (1950). 
33 Bliley Elec. Co. v. Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 549, 45 A. (2d) 898 (1946). 
34 28 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 1332 at 1334 (1953). 
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an inquiry into the dynamics of the circumstances which created the 
unemployment, but such inquiry does not adequately explain the re-
sults. The above factors indicate that any analysis which relies mainly 
upon consensual relations is inaccurate. The situation contemplated 
by the unemployment compensation acts involved a unilateral decision 
on the part of the worker or the employer, not one in which a union 
has previously negotiated a specific date for retirement. It has been 
urged that in view of the general purpose of the unemployment com-
pensation laws, the test as to whether unemployment is voluntary 
should be determined by the employee's willingness to be in the labor 
market (assuming that his prior leaving of work was for "good cause") 
and not by the relationship existing between employee and employer.35 
V. Conclusion 
The age composition of the United States' population is under-
going a substantial shift upwards. 36 With this advancing age, the 
number of workers who are retired or are facing retirement will be 
growing every year. Scientific advances have prolonged the life expect-
ancy of the average employee, but social and economic development 
have placed age limitations upon his employment activity. In view of 
the obstacles confronting an older person in obtaining new employ-
ment, a decision that he left "voluntarily" and is therefore not entitled 
to benefits might serve to reverse to some extent the social and legis-
lative trend toward providing honorable alternatives to "poor relief."37 
If it is determined that unemployment compensation is recoverable in 
the "retirement" cases, an employer may use this fact in his negotia-
tions with the union for retirement and pension plans. A decision that 
a worker did not quit "voluntarily" will also protect employees who 
are retired in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement but are 
unable to qualify for pension benefits. Thus, the amount received from 
unemployment benefits could act as a Hoor which all workers would 
receive as a consequence of these retirement plans.38 A further basis 
for holding such a leaving "involuntary" might be found in statutory 
provisions which prohibit an individual from waiving or releasing his 
35 Harrison, "Statutory Purpose and 'Involuntary Unemployment,'" 55 YALB L.J. 
117 (1945). 
36 In the 1950 census, 8% (or 12 million) of the total population were 65 years and 
over, and 3 million of them were in the labor force. Bancroft, "Older Persons in the Labor 
Force," 279 .ANNALS 52 at 53 (1952). 
37W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review, 129 N.J.L. 402 at 405, 29 A. (2d) 858 
(1943). 
38 Ar.:rMAN, AvAILAllILITY FOR Wonx 18 (1950). 
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rights to unemployment benefits.39 Since, absent agreement, forced 
retirement would constitute "involuntary" unemployment, if the bar-
gaining agreement renders the retirement "voluntary" the claimant is 
waiving his right to unemployment compensation by entering into the 
retirement contract. 40 
These policy arguments indicate that those courts and administra-
tive tribunals which have decided that the worker's leaving is "invol-
untary" have reached a desirable result. As discussed earlier, however, 
the analyses used in arriving at that result have not always been as 
satisfactory. A close inspection of the interrelation between the em-
ployer, the employee and his union bargaining agent raises collateral 
issues which border on being superfluous. Considerations of public 
and legislative policy, as discussed above, furnish all the foundation 
necessary to arrive at a sound decision. 
Lawrence N. Ravick, S.Ed. 
89Wash. Laws (Rem. Supp. 1945) §9998-321; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1952) tit. 43, 
§861; 43 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 43, §2l-15(a). 
40 Glover v. Simmons Co., 31 N.J. Super. 308, 106 A. (2d) 318 (1954). 
